

回 注目を集めるインセンティブに関する経済学的論考を精選

インセンティブの経済理論 全2巻 The Economic Theory of Incentives. 2 vols.

Martimort, David (ed.), The Economic Theory of Incentives. 2 vols. (The International Library of Critical Writings in Economics Series 338) 1880 pp. 2017:11 (E. Elgar, UK) <100-4729>
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「ある行動をとる要因」であるインセンティブは、近年ミクロ経済学、とりわけ情報の経済学においてキーワードとなっています。本書はインセンティブの経済理論に関する主要な論文を集めており、非対称情報、モラル・ハザード、不完備契約のコンテキストにおける集団意思決定問題を概観しています。第1巻は「非対称情報下の集団意思決定問題」、「モラル・ハザード下の集団意思決定」、第2巻は「集団意思決定問題—不完備契約と立証不可能性パラダイム」「集団意思決定問題—多契約組織」の部より構成されています。

本書を経済学、ミクロ経済学、情報の経済学、インセンティブに関心を持つ研究者・研究室にお薦めいたします。

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